JACKSON vs. Y. & C. RAILROAD CO.

The District Court for the City and County of Philadelphia,
while the rules of 1842, requiring special pleas after the manner
of the rules of Hilary Term 1834, were in force, expressed a d-etermination to follow the English practice: Lincoln vs. Souder, 4
Penna. Law Jour. 107.
P. P. M.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Maine.
JACKSON VS. THE Y. & C. RAILROAD COMPANY.
Without some statutory provision, no action can be maintained in the name of an
assignee, upon interest coupons, which contain no negotiable words, nor
language from which it can be inferred, that it was the design of the corporation issuing them, to treat them as negotiable paper, or as creating an obligation distinct from, and independent of, the bonds to which they were severally
attached when the bonds were issued.
The negotiability of such coupons is a question of law, to be determined, from the
papers themselves, by fixed and well-settled rules ; and proof of custom, as to
the negotiability of them, is inadmissible.
The bonds being specialties, the remedy for breaches thereof, is by an action, not
of assumpsit, but of debt or of covenant broken; not being legally assignable,
no action is maintainable in the name of the holder, though be be assignee.
Goounmow, J., dissenting.
It is indispensable to its maintenance that the cause of action exist at the time the
action was commenced. The statute of 1856, c. 248, does not remedy this defect.

This was an action of assumnpsit, brought on eleven memoranda
in writing, called "coupons,"

issued by the defendant corporation,
promising to pay various sums of money on each of said coupon
on the first day of May, 1854. The general issue was pleaded.
The plaintiff, after reading the writ and coupons, called Daniel 0.
Emery, who testified that he signed the coupons declared upon in
the writ, as treasurer of the defendant corporation ; that these coupons were issued by the said corporation in connection with and attached to certain bonds, upon the same sheets of paper with the

bonds, and that they were each and all so issued by the defendant
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corporation for a valuable consideration, as appeared by the bond
book of the defendants, then in Court.
The plaintiff then introduced one of the bonds declared upon in
this writ, No. 60, for $300, and the parties agreed that this bond
should be a sample of, and substituted for, all the- other bonds
referred to, by numbers upon the several coupons declared upon,
differing from them only in the number appearing on their face,
and in the amount of money therein promised to be paid. Said
Emery further testified that all the coupons, declared upon in the
plaintiff's writ, were, when issued by the said defendants, attached to
bonds as aforesaid.
On cross-examination,he testified that the several bonds, to which
the coupons declared upon were attached, when first issued by defendants, were issued to different persons, some to E. L. Cummings,
and some to others, but none to the plaintiff.
The defendants' counsel then called E. L. Cummings, who, at
request of counsel, produced two writs, pending in this Court, each
against the said defendant corporation, one in favor of William C.
Lord and the other in favor of the witness, on coupons No. 6 of the
bonds from which coupons No. 5, declared on in this suit, were taken, and upon other coupons from different bonds.
Defendants' counsel then asked the witness if he owned all the
bonds referred to upon the coupons, in the suit at bar, at the date
of the writ. The question was objected to by plaintiff, but admitted,
and the witness answered that he did then own them.
The plaintiff offered to prove the custom as to the negotiability
of these coupons. This testimony was ruled out by the Court.
The defendants offered to prove that the bonds, referred tp in the
coupons in suit, were, when originally issued by the defendant corporation to Cummings and others, as above appears, issued for a
less sum than their nominal value. This testimony was excluded
by the Court. The case was thereupon taken from the jury, the
defendant defaulted, and the case reported by the presiding Judge,
HOWARD, for the decision of the full Court.
B. L. Ciummings, for the plaintiff.
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J. C. Woodman, for the defendants.
The opinion concurred in by a majority of the Judges was drawn
up by
TENNEY, C. J.-The plaintiff claims, in this action of assurnpsit,
the amount due on certain memoranda in writing, called coupons,
signed by the treasurer of the defendants. They were originally
upon the same sheet, with bonds to which each corresponded respectively, and which were issued by the company and signed by
the proper officers, with the seal of the corporation affixed.
None of the bonds, to which the coupons in suit were severally
annexed, were made to the plaintiff, and it appeared that he did
not own the bonds at the commencement of the suit ; and it did not
appear that he had any interest in them, at any time.
A copy of the bond, numbered 60, from which one of the coupons
in suit was taken, is made a part of the case, and the portion
thereof, material to the question before us, is in these words :"Know all men by these presents, that the York and Cumberland
Railroad Company acknowledge themselves indebted to Toppan
Robie, or bearer, in the sum of three hundred dollars, which sum
they promise to pay Toppan Robie, or bearer, in the city of Portland, on the first day of November, A. D. 1871, with interest
thereon, payable semi-annually, at said city of Portland', on the first
day of May and November, in each year, upon the surrender of
the corresponding coupon hereto annexed, at the office of the company in Portland." The coupon taken from the bond, of which the
foregoing is copied, is in the following terms :-" -York and Cumberland Railroad Company. Coupon No. 1. Bond No. 60. On
the first day of May, 1852, the York and Cumberland Railroad
Company will pay nine dollars, on this coupon, in Portland. $9."
Signed by the treasurer of the company.
The other bonds,'from which the coupons in suit were respectively taken, are in the same form, varying in the amount and numbers, and the other coupons, which are declared upon in this action,
are similar in form to the one copied, varying, also, in the sum
named and in numbers.
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The coupons on their face are not made payable to any person
named, nor to the bearer thereof. Each refers, by the number, tc
the bond with which it was connected, and made part of the same ;
this is apparent, when separated therefrom. The language of th
bond clearly imports, that the expectation of the company, and of
the holder of the bond, was, that the coupon would continue to be
part and parcel thereof, till the interest, as it should become due
and payable upon the bond, at the respective times specified therein,
should be paid, and then, the coupon corresponding in time and
amount with such interest would be separated from the bond, and
surrendered to the company. The possession of the coupon, by the
company, and the want of the same upon the bond, or in the hands
of the holder, would be evidence of payment, and would supersede
the necessity of indorsement of interest, as it should be paid from
time to time.
The coupons in this case, containing no negotiable words, nor
any language implying, or from which it can be inferred, that it
was the design of the company to treat them as negotiable paper,
or as creating any obligation, distinct from, and independent of
the bonds to which they were severally attached, no action can be
maintained thereon, in the name of an assignee, without some statutory provision.
The proof offered by the plaintiff, of the custom, as to the negotiability of these coupons, was properly excluded. Whether paper
is negotiable or not is a question of law, to be determined from the
paper itself, by fixed and well-settled rules.
But, it is said that coupons are negotiable by the custom of merchants. " General mercantile customs, which have frequeptly become the subject of legal investigation in the course of evidence,
when ascertained by long experience to be of public use and utility,
are at last recognised and adopted by the law without further
proof." 2 Stark. Ev. 450. In the case of Edie vs. Ecyst India
Company, 2 Burr. 1216, Justice FosTER said, " Much has been
said about the custom of merchants, but the custom of merchants
or the law of merchants, is the law of the kingdoin and is part of
the common law. People do not sufficiently distinguish between
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customs of different sorts; the true distinction is between general
customs, which are a part of the common law, and local customs
which are not so. This custom of merchants is the general law of
the kingdom ; part of the common law; and therefore, should not
have been left to the jury, after it had been settled by judicial determinations." In the case of Pillans vs. Iicross, 3 Burr. 1669,
Lord M'NSrIELD said, " a witness cannot be admitted to prove the
law of merchants."
It is said by Mr. PARSONS, in his work on Oontracts,.vol. 1, p.
240,-" It may, however, be said here, that we regard the English
authorities as making all instruments negotiable, which are payable
to bearer, and are also customably transferrable by delivery, within
which definition, we suppose, that the common bonds of railroad
companies would fall. Of the coupons attached, which have no seal,
this would seem to be probable." These remarks are inapplicable to the coupons which are the basis of the present suit, they
not being payable to the order of any person, or to bearer.
The bonds, with which these coupons were connected, are specialties, and actions of assumpsit thereon for breaches are not maintainable, but the remedy is by action of debt or covenant broken.
And such instruments are not legally assignable, so that a suit can
be sustained in the name of an assignee or holder.
In the bonds to which the coupons were originally attached, now
in suit, interest was secured equally with the principal. It is not
easy to perceive that, so far as the interest is secured by the bonds,
a different form of action could be treated as the remedy for the
breach of this part of the covenant, from that required, if the company should fail to pay the principal. The coupons attached to
the bonds certainly do not cancel or nullify the covenant in the bond
to pay the interest, and if suits in assumpsit can be maintained for
the former, the company is liable to the payment of double inter
est.
This action was commenced and the same was tried prior to the
statute of 1856, c. 248. It is a.general principle that the cause
of action must exist at the time it is instituted, as indispensable to
its maintenance ; otherwise the obligation of the contract would be
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impaired. No cause for this action in the name of the plaintiff is
shown at the time it was commenced, or when the trial took place.
And the statute does not profess to remedy this defect.
Plaintiff nonsuited.
GooDENow, J., dissenting.-This is an action of assuMpst.
founded on certain coupons, which were attached to bonds issued
by the defendants, payable to Toppan Robie or bearer. It is admitted that the plaintiff is not, and never was, the owner of the
bonds from which the coupons offered in evidence have been cut
off. It is contended on the part of the defence, that these coupons
are not negotiable, and that no action can be maintained upon them,
in the name of any other person than the owner of the bonds; and
secondly, that if any action can be maintained by the plaintiff, it
should be an action of covenant or debt, and not assumpsit.
In Miller vs. Race, 1 Burr. 452, it was settled that property in
a bank note passes like that in cash, by delivery ; and a party taking
it bond fide, and for value, is entitled to retain it as against the
former owner from whom it has been stolen ; and that property in
negotiable instruments will pass like that in coin, along with the
possession, when they have been put in that state, in which, according to the usage and custom of trade, they are transferred by
one man to another by delivery. 1 Smith's Leading Cases, Miller
vs..Race, [258,] note. Whenever an instrument is such that the
legal right to the property, secured thereby, passes from one man
to another by the delivery thereof, it is, properly speaking, a negotiable instrument, and the title to it will vest in any person taking
it bond fide, and for value, whatever may be the defects in the title
of the person transferring it to him. Ibid.
It appears to be settled, in American cases, that the holder of
a negotiable note is primd facie entitled to recover, upon merely
producing the note ; but, if the defendant proves that the note was
fraudulent in its inception, ok fraudulently put in circulation, or
stolen, or lost, or obtained by duress, there is thrown upon the
plaintiff the burden of proving that he is a holder bond fide, and
for a valuable consideration. Ibid. 263, b, note.
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Professor Parsons, in his work on the Law of Contracts, says,
(vol. 1, p. 203,) "We may find the reasons of the law of negotiable
bills and notes in their origin and purpose. By interchange of
property, men supply each other's wants and their own, at the same
time. In the beginning of society, this could be done only by actual barter, as it is now among the rudest savages. But very early
money was invented as the representative of all property, and as
measuring its convertible value. The utility of this means enlarged,
as the wants of commerce, which grew with civilization, were developed. But at length more was needed; it became expedient to
take a further step ; and negotiable paper, first bills of exchange,
and then promissory notes, were introduced into mercantile use, as
the representative of the representative of property; that is, as the
representative of money. * * But, still, coin was itself a substantial
article, not easily moved to great distances in large quantities ; and
while it adequately represented all property, it failed to represent
credit. And this new invention was made, and negotiable paper
introduced to extend this representation another degree. It does
not represent property directly, but money. And, as in one form,
it represents the money into which it is convertible at the pleasure
of the holder, so, in another form, it represents a future payment
of money, and then it represents credit."
If a note be originally made payable to "bearer," it is negotiated or transferred by delivery only, and needs no indorsement,
any person bearing or presenting the note becoming, in that case,
the party to whom the maker of the note promises to pay it, and
the holder of negotiable paper indorsed in blank, or made payable
to bearer, is presumed to be the owner for consideration. Id. 206.
It was the intention of the defendants, in issuing these railroad
bonds and coupons, to create a new species of negotiable paper.
As such, it would more readily pass into circulation and command
a higher price in the market, without increasing their burthens.
They could as conveniently pay the interest, as it became due, to
the holders of the coupons, whoever they might be, as to the obligees, or bearers of these bonds. There is no promisee named in
the coupons. The law will imply that the promise is to the holder,
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bondfide. From the peculiar terms of the contract, it is reasonable
to conclude, that the parties understood and agreed that the coupons
should, from time to time, as the interest became due, be separated
from the bonds, and pass into circulation as the representative of
money.
If the action were founded on the bonds for thie recovery of the
principalsum and intereston the coupons annexed to them, it might,
perhaps, be successfully contended, that it should be debt or covenant, and not an action of assumpsit.
But it seems, that it is, and was intended to be, a contract in the
alternative, depending upon future contingencies or acts of the obligees ; a contract under seal to pay the obligee or bearer, if he retains the coupons with the bond, and brings his action to recover
principal and interest at the same time; or a promise to pay the
holder of the coupons, if the obligee or bearer of the bond shall
choose to cut them off, and dispose of them, retaining the bond.
It is the same in all negotiable promissory notes.
"If A. in his note promises to pay B., or his order, then the
original promise is in the alternative, and it is this which makes the
note negotiable. The promise is to pay either B. or some one else,
to whom B. shall direct the payment to be made. And when B.
orders the payment to be made to C., then C. may demand it under
the original promise. He may say the promise was made to B.,
but it was a promise to pay C. as soon as he should come within the
condition ; that is, as soon as he should become the payee by order
of B. And then the law merchant extends this somewhat, by
saying that the original promise was in fact to pay either to B. or
or to C., if B. shall order payment made to him, or to any person to
whom C. shall order payment made, after B. has ordered payment
made to C." 1 Parsons on Contracts, 202, 203.
Cutting the coupons from the bonds, by the obligee, and delivering them to a third person, may be regarded as equivalent to the
indorsement of paper payable to order, or the delivery of paper
payable to bearer. It would extinguish the claim of the holder
of the bonds pro tanto, upon the defendants, and create a new ob-
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ligation, in lieu of it, to pay the same amount to the holder of the
coupons.
This would furnish an adequate consideration for the promise of
tne defendants to pay the bearer or holder of the coupons. To
this the defendants may be considered as consenting, when they
executed and isiued the bonds.
The obligation to pay, "does not rest upon the ground of any
actual or supposed relationship between the parties, as some of the
earlier cases would seem to indicate." "But upon the broader
and more satisfactory basis, that the law, operating on the act of
the parties, under the duty, establishes the privity, and implies the
promise and obligation, on which the action is founded." Brewer
vs. -Dyer,7 Cush. 337.
Professor Parsons says (vol. 1, p.'240), "We regard the English
authorities as making all instruments negotiable which are payable
to bearer, and are also transferrable by delivery, Within which definition we suppose that common bonds of railroad companies would
fall. Of the coupons.attached, which have no seal, this would seem
to be probable. But usage must have great influence in determining
this question." Note o and cases cited.
The case finds, that the plaintiff offered to prove the "custom"
as to the negotiability of these coupons, and that this testimony
was ruled out by the Court. The ruling of the presiding Justice
was not, in this respect, erroneous. It was a question of law.
Public policy, as well as the interest of the partie§, requires that
the question should be settled distinctly, one way or the other, as
matter of law, and should not depend upon the veldict" of a jury, in
each particular case.
"Although an instrument may contain nothing on the face of
it inconsistent with the character of negotiability, still, if be not
Accustomably transferrable in the same manner as cash, it will not
be looked upon as a negotiable instrument. Thus, in Lang vs.
Smith, 7 Bing. 284, a question arising, whether certain instruments called bordereaux and coupons, which purported to entitle
the bearer to portions of the public debt of the kingdom of Naples,
were negotiable instruments, the jury having found that they did
VOL. XI-38
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not usually pass from hand to hand like money; that finding was
held conclusive to show that they were not negotiable instruments.
Whether an instrument, which has never been solemnly recognised
by the law as negotiable, be accustomably transferrable by delivery,
or not, is a question which must, in each case, be left to the determination of a jury. It was submitted to the jury in Lang vs.
S'mith, and held to have been rightly so."
1 Smith's Leading
Cases 261, note.
Without any proof of usage or custom, on the part of the plaintiff,
the Court are authorized to decide, from the face of the contract,
its origin and purpose, that these coupons are negotiable instruments.
In Lang vs. Smith,-" These," said TINDAL, C. J., "are not
English instruments, recognised by the law of England, but Neapolitan securities, brought to the notice of the Court for the first
time, and, as Judges, we are not allowed to form an opinion on
them unless supplied with evidence as to the law of the country

whence they came. Judges have only taken upon themselves to decide the nature of instruments recognised by the laws of this country,
as bills of exchange, which pass current by the law merchant, dividend
warrants, or exchequer bills, the transfer of which is founded on
statutes, which a Judge in an English Court is bound to know."
In Clark vs. Farmers' Manufacturing Co., 15 Wend. 256, it
was held that a note for the payment of money under seal, though
in all other respects like a promissory note, is not negotiable.
The plaintiff declared in debt, as the indorsee of the instrument.
He proved the death of the payee, and the indorsement of the
note to him by his executor.
It does not appear that the indorsement by the executor was
under seal.
Without intending to question the correctness of the conclusion
of the Court in that case, the case under consideration is regarded
as one essentially differing 'from it. We have before adverted to
its peculiarities.
In Rinkley vs. Fowler, 15 Maine 285, SHIEPLEY, J., after stating
certain well established rules, says, "Without a violation of these
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rules. a statute or record, or sealed instrument, may not only be
used as evidence, but may form the very foundation out of which
arises an action of assumpsit."
In Benner vs. Mears, 2 Bl. R. 1269, the defendant made a bond
to one Cox, and. indorsed upon it an agreement to pay to any
assignee of Cox ; the plaintiff being assignee maintained assumpsit.
"Innes vs. Wallace, 8 T. R. 595, was assumpsit by the assignee against the obligor of a stock bond, and the Court say this
is not an action on the bond ; that the assignment is a consideration for the assumpsit, and liken it to an assumpsit on a foreign
judgment."
From the best examination and consideration I have been enabled to give this case, I arrive at the conclusion that the coupons
declared upon must be regarded as negotiable instruments ; and that
when transferred, by being cut off and delivered, the holder of them,
in good faith and for value, may maintain an action of assumpsit
in his own name against the defendants.
NOTE. Since the above was written, Redfield on Railways has been published,
to which I refer, page 595, 239, and cases there cited.
The foregoing case involves a question in form the same as bills of exchange;
of very considerable practical interest, such as bankers' checks, bank bills, and
but some of the propositions maintained even certificates of deposit in some inin the opinion of the Chief Justice, with stances, when made payable to order:
whom the majority of the Court concur, Stoney vs. American Life Insurance Co.,
seem to us not altogether reconcileable 11 Paige 634.
with the more recent decisions of the
II. The rule in regard to negotiable
paper has been so far extended in EngAmerican Courts.
I. lie regards the well-established gland, as to include pullic stocks, or
rules of the old common law, as recog- state and national securities: Gorgier
nising nothing as strictly negotiable vs. Mieville, 3 B. & Cress. 45; Lane vs.
except bills of exchange and promissory Smith, 7 Bing. 284. In both of these
notes. This is explicitly declared by cases, which arose upon the public secuBaoNsox, J., in Birchhead vs. Brown, rities of foreign governments, evidence
5 Hill N. Y. Rep. 634, 646. The cases seems to have been received to show
bearing upon the question are carefully that by the custom of business among
digested in 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 824; 1 merchants and others in England, these
Smith's Lead. Cas. 435, Am. note. The securities passed by delivery like toney.
rule has been extended, by courtesy, And the latter case, which arose upon
among mercantile men, to many forms Neapolitan bonds, with coupons attached
of contract, analogous, but not strictly for the payment of interest, TINDAL, C.
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J., said in reply to the point, that the
Court should have decided the question
of negotiability as a question of law,
and not have admitted evidence of the
custom of trade in regard to them, after
declaring, that upon their face these
Neapolitan bonds gave no evidence of
being negotiable; "We are not allowed
to form an opinion on them, unless supplied with evidence as to the law of the
place whence they come;" and adds,
that Courts can only decide such paper
to be negotiable as is made so by statute,
which Courts are bound to know. It is
well known to the profession, that long
before any English statute existed, making notes or bills negotiable, they were
so treated by custom and the usages of
trade, which, upon any controversy arising, were determined bya special jury of
merchants, partly upon their own knowledge, and partly upon -the testimony
of others experienced in these matters,
much as we receive the testimony of
experts at the present day, upon scientific questions.
It seems very proper then, that when
any question arises in the Courts in
regard to the negotiability of securities
known in the market, the custom of
merchants in regard to treating them as
negotiable, should be received as one
element to enable the Court to arrive at
a satisfactory solution of the question
of their negotiability. And so it seems
the English Courts proceeded in regard
to the question, when it arose as to the
public securities of foreign states.
The same rule has been adopted in
the American Courts in regard to the
public securities of the different states:
Delafield vs. The State of Illinois, 2 Hill
N. Y. Rep. 159.
And the same rule has been extended
in England to the case of Exchequer
Bills: Hookey vs. Pole, 4 Barn. & Ald. 1.
1IL It is now entirely well settled in

the American Courts, that the deben
tures (as they are called in England,
which literally imports certificates of
indebtedness, and which are more commonly called in this country bonds,
whether under seal or not, by which is
meant obligation, in the general sense
of the word), when issued by railways
or other private corporations, either in
blank, or made payable to bearer, or to
some one by name, or bearer, or his
order, and indorsed blank, all of which
forms are regarded as equivalent in
legal force, must be regarded as negotiable instruments, because the practice
of business men throughout the country
has made them so: Morris Canal and
Boating Co. vs. Fisher, 1 Stockton Ch.
Rep. 667; Mechanics' Bank vs. N. Y. &
N. H. Railway, 8 Kernan 599; S. 0. 4
Duer 480; Carr vs. Le Fevre, 27 Penn.
Rep. 413.
And very recently the question came
before the United States Supreme Court
in White vs. Vermont and Massachusetts
Railway Co., where the negotiability of
the instruments was fully maintained: 21
How. Rep. 575. And in Chapin vs. same
defendant, 8 Gray 575, the same doctrine
is maintained. The same rule has been
repeatedly extended to the securities issued by counties, cities, and other municipalities: Craig vs. The City of Vicksburg, 31 Miss. Rep. 216.
But the English Courts have not
treated these railway bonds, or debentures as they call them, as strictly negotiable: Athenmum Life Insurance Co.
vs. Pooley, 5 Jur. N. S. 129; S. C. 3 Do
Gex & Jones 294 (1859).
And the
English Courts, in a carefully considerea
case, have very recently held, that a
corporation is not holden by a strictly
negotiable instrument purporting to be
issued by them, and regular upon its
face, provided the company had no
authority to issue the same, thus making
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a distinction in that respect, between
securities irregularly issued and those
which were ultra vires: Balfour vs.
Ernest, 6 Jur. N. S. 439.
IV. A distinction has sometimes been
attempte to be made between the right
to maintain an action upon the interest
coupons and the debenture certificates
themselves. Thus, in Crosby vs. New
London W. & P. Railway Co., 26 Conn.
Rep. 121, where the plaintiff brought an
action upon one of the coupons attached
to the bonds issued by the company,
and in formvery similar to the one sued
in the present case, it was held the
action could not be maintained upon the
coupon, as that was not to be regarded
as a distinct and independent contract,
but a mere accessory of the bond, and
that the action should, therefore, have
been upon the bond. Butwe apprehend
that no such distinction is maintained
in practice, but that the coupons are
regarded as equally negotiable with the
bonds, and that they pass currently as
money the same as the bonds themselves.
And the fact that they do not contain
the name of any payee, or purport to be
made payable to bearer, does not seem
to us of any practical importance, if,
in fact, among business men, they have
acquired the character of negotiable
securities, and of this, we think there
can be no question. Mr. Justice McLEAN
seems to have entertained similar doubts
in the case of Williamson, Trustee, vs.
New Albany and Salem Railway, 9 Am.
Railway Times, March 12, 1857. But
in White vs. Vermont and Massachusetts
Railway Co., supra, it was regarded as
no objection to the bearer maintaining
an action upon the bonds, that they
were issued in blank and contained no
promise to pay to the bearer. It is said
any bona fiU, holder may fill up the
blank with his own name, whenever he
finds it necessary to bring an action;

and "make them payable to himself or
bearer, or to order. In other words,
the company intended, by the blank, to
leave the holder his option as to the
form or character of the negotiability,
without restriction." "As to the negotiability of this class of securities," says
Mr. Justice NELSON, "we think the
usage and practice of the companies
themselves, and of the capitalists and
business men of the country dealing in
them, as well as the repeated decisions,
or recognition of the principle by Courts
and Judges of the highest respectability,
have settled the question." And if so,
we are confident it will ultimately be
regarded as extending to the coupons,
or interest warrants, as well as to the
securities themselves, since both are
equally a promise to pay the amount to
the bearer, and botlh pass without restriction, in the market as money. It
is in practice an unusual event for the
holder of the bonds to present his own
coupons to the treasurer of the company
for payment. They are in practice always negotiated through the banks and
brokers. There seems, therefore, an
imperious necessity for holding both
negotiable securities.
Tile very able and satisfactory opinion
of Mr. Justice GooDnEow renders further
comment needless. But it should be remembered, that many of the obstacles in
the way of the negotiability of these instruments, alluded to by Ch. J. TENNEY,
have hitherto induced the English Courts
to deny the character of negotiability
both to the bonds and the coupons, and
it is only in the case of White vs. Vermont
and Massachusetts Railway Co., supra,
decided after the principal case, that the
English cases were distinctly overruled
in this country. And even at the present moment (1863), there seems to be
no decis'on directly in conflict with the
principal case.
I. F. R.

IN RE JACOB SPANGLER.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
IN THE MATTER OF JACOB SPANGLER.
One Spangler was properly enrolled among the militia, from whom a draft was to
be made. By mistake the name was written Spangle on the ballot put into the
oox from which the quota for the county was to be drawn. This ballot being
among those drawn, the Court were of opinion that the draft was not vitiated
by the error in the name.
Where one person is held in custody by another, acting in the right of and under
the authority of the General Government, or claiming in good faith and under
color of such authority to be so acting, the State Courts have no jurisdiction to
inquire into the validity of such authority, and to discharge the person so held
from custody.
Where a draft was made under a law of Congress, but under the direction of the
Governor of the State, and by Draft Commissioners appointed by him, it was
held that the persons drafted and in custody of the Draft Commissioners, were
held under national authority, and that the State Courts had no jurisdiction to
inquire into the validity of the draft on habeas corpus.

Habeas corpus, directed to Randolph Strickland, Draft Commissioner of Clinton county. The facts of the case, as they appear
by the return and the admissions of the parties, are concisely
stated in the opinion of Justice CAMPBELL.
J. L. Chipman, for petitioner.
A. Bussell, United States District Attorney, for respondent.
MARTIN, C. J.-Were it not for the importance of the jurisdictional question presented in this case, and the imperative .necessity
for its settlement at this time, I should content myself with deciding that upon the undisputed facts of this case, there is no error
in the proceedings of the Draft Commissioner, and that Spangler
must be redelivered to his custody. His name was fully given
and properly spelled upon 'the enrollment, and the trifling mistake
of dropping out a letter from his name upon the ballots, when the
person was clearly designated, could not render the draft invalid.
But I am not willing to turn the case off upon this point. The
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main and all important question is one of jurisdiction, and it is
this which I shall consider. The solution of this question depends,
in my view, entirely upon that of whether Spangler is held by the
Draft Commissioner under Federal or State authority; for, if
under the former, we have no jurisdiction, while if under the latter,
we have.
I do not concede that the return of the Commissioner that he
holds Spangler under or by virtue of the authority of the United
States, is of itself sufficient to deprive us of jurisdiction to inquire
into the cause of his detention-for this is a traversable fact ; but
I do concede, that if so held, we have no jurisdiction to inquire
further as to the legality of such detention, but that the whole subject is exclusively within that of the Courts of the United States.
The first question therefore is, under what authority is he held?
The Constitution of the United States, Art. 1, Sect. 8, empowers Congress to raise and support armies, to provide for calling
forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrection, and to repel invasion, and to provide for organizing,.
arming, and disciplining the same, and for governing such part
of them as may be employed in the service of the United States,
reserving to the States respectively, the appointments of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress, and to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying such plans into execution.
The Constitution itself was framed and adopted for the purposes, among others, of insuring domestic tranquillity and promoting the general welfare of the people of the. United States ;
and the power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its
services in times of insurrection, are natural incidents to the duty
of watching over the internal peace of the Union. (See Federalist, No. 29.) This whole power was conferred upon Congress,
reserving only to the States the appointments of the officers, and
the training of the militia according to the discipline prescribed
by Congress. In the exercise of this power, Congress, by the Act
of July 17th, 1862 (Ch. 201), enacted that the President should
call forth the militia-if, by reason of defects in existing laws, or
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in the execution of them, in the several States, or in any of them,
it should be found necessary to provide for enrolling the militia,
and otherwise putting the Act into execution-he was authorized
in such case to make all necessary rules and regulations for such
purpose-the power of calling forth the militia already being reposed in him by existing laws. By virtue of this authority, upon
the 4th of August, 1862, the President ordered a draft of 300,000
militia, to be immediately called into the service of the United
States, and directed- the Secretary of War to assign the quotas to
the States, and establish regulations for the draft, &c.
Such assignments were accordingly made, and upon the 9th of
August orders were issued from the War Department requiring the
Governors of the respective States to proceed forthwith to furnish
their respective quotas, directing an enrollment to be made of all
able-bodied citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five,
and providing and ordering that where no provision was made by
law in any State for carrying into effect the draft thereby ordered,
or when such provisions were in any manner defective, the draft
should be conducted in a manner specified in such order, one provision of which requires the Governor to appoint a Draft Commissioner for each county, fixing his compensation and giving minute
directions to him as to the discharge of his duties. The Governor
of this State, .finding that an imperfect military census had been
taken, and that there were defects in our State laws, that inequality
would occur in their execution, observed, in ordering the draft in
question, the law of Congress and the orders of the War Department, and did not proceed under the State law. In this he exercised an executive discretion, with which we cannot interfere, and.
which, I think, was wise and proper. As he was not executing
the laws of Michigan, he was, of necessity, obeying the laws. of
Congress and the orders of the President. The Draft Commissioner appointed by him was consequently a Federal, and not a
State officer, and the draft was made under Federal authority, and
the relator is held as such. The only remaining question is that
of the jurisdiction of this Court, and of State officers, to inquire
into the regularity of the draft, in the legality of Spangler's de-
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tention. Upon this question I think there can he no doubt that
we have none. The Federal Government and the State Governments exist as independently as the governments of the several
States. Each acting within its sphere is foreign to the other and
independent, and this principle extends to the jurisdiction of the
Courts of each- Except in the case of the appellate jurisdiction
conferred upon the Supreme Court of the United States, the
Courts have jurisdiction only commensurate with the law of the
State or nation under which they severally exist. An abuse of
the authority of the United States, although committed by a citizen of this State, is an offence (says Chancellor KENT) against the
United States, and exclusively cognisable in their Courts. If this
be so, the exercise of power under such authority is equally under
such exclusive jurisdiction. The views of Chief Justice TANEY,
in Ablenzan vs. Booth, 21 Howard 506, are so apposite and exhaustive of this subject, and meet so fully with my concurrence,
that it is hardly possible for me to do more than to refer to them as
containing the whole law upon the subject. Questions of this kind,
as he says, must always depend upon the Constitution and laws
of the United States, and not of a State. The Constitution was
not framed merely to guard the States against danger from foreign
nations, but mainly to secure union and harmony at home: for if
this object could be attained, there would be but little danger from
abroad ; and to accomplish this purpose it was felt by the statesmen who framed the Constitution, and by the people who adopted
it, that it was necessary that many of the rights of sovereignty
which the States then possessed should be ceded to the General
Government, and that in the sphere of action assigned to it, it
should be ,upreme and strong enough to execute its own laws by
its own tribunals, without interruption from a State or from State
authorities.
The writ must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
CIIRISTIANCY, J.-I
concur with my brethren in the result at
which they have arrived in this case; but as there is a difference
in the mode of arriving at that result, it is proper that I should
briefly indicate the grounds of my opinion.

IN RE JACOB SPANGLER.

Had the Commissioner sought to hold the prisoner under the
State law authorizing a draft, there could be no doubt of the
jurisdiction of this Court to issue this writ of habeas corpus, and
to discharge the prisoner, at any time before he had been actually
mustered into the service of the United States.
But the Draft Commissioner does not claim to detain the prisoner
under the State law; and it is evident from the face of the paper
set out in the returns, that no attempt was made to effect the draft
under the State law.
The draft here in question was made solely under the authority
of the Act of Congress of July 17th, 1862, and the order of the
President made for the purpose of carrying this law into effectthe order of the Secretary of War being-the order of the President, as clearly as if issued and signed by the President himself.
But it is objected' that, in pursuance of the Act of Congress,
the draft should have been had under the State law, which, for
this purpose, had been recognised by the Act, except in cases
where the President should first decide with special reference to
this State, that the State laws were defective, or defectively executed, and should therefore issue his orders, specially applicable
to this State, prescribing the manner in which the enlistments
should be made and the Act carried into effect-that he had no
right to issue the general order stated in this return, leaving it to
the Executive of the respective States to determine the question.
The Act of Congress of July 17th, 1862 (Sect. 1), does not
declare by whom this question is to be determined, but merely that,
" If, by reason of defects in existing laws, or in the execution of
them in the several States, or any of them, it shall be found necessary," &c., the President is authorized to make such rules and
regulations. The power is made contingent only upon the fact of
such a condition of the State laws, or of their execution-not upon
the determination of the question by any particular pei'son or
officer. And I can see no reason why the President may not act,
when this fact is found by the Governor of a State, upon whom
the call is made for men, as well as if found by the President.
The Governors of the States must be much more intimately
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acquainted with the character of the State laws, and the difficulties
and defects in their execution; and practically, it seems to me,
the question must, as a general rule, be left to the determination
of the State Executive, except in those States where either the
State authorities or the people are supposed to be disloyal to the
Federal Government. 'Should the Governor inform the President
that the laws of his state were so defective, or defectively executed,
that he could not furnish the requisite number of men in due
season under them, it could hardly be expected that the President
would overrule his decision. Or take the reverse of the case here
given, and suppose the Governor to have decided that the laws of
his State are neither defective nor defectively executed, and that
he so informs the President, could it be expected that the President
would disregard this decision or opinion of -the Governor, and
proceed to require the draft to be made under the Act of Congress
and his own Executive order, without reference to the .State law?
Should the President thus Act, we should doubtless have more
complaints than we have yet heard of his exercise of arbitrary
power, and certainly *withmore reason.
Hence I am satisfied that though the President may decide
upon this question of the defective condition or execution of the
State laws, in States which are in insurrection or more or less
affected by the rebellion, or where there is good reason to apprehend disloyalty on the part of the State Executive, yet he may,
if he see fit, and should, in other cases, leave this question to be
decided by the State Executive. Hence, I think the President
was fully justified in issuing the general order, attached to the
return regulating the enrollment and draft in all cases where laws
of the State are defective or defectively executed, leaving it to the
State Executive to determine the question : and when so determined by the State Executive, that determination, as in the present
case, is equally valid and effectual as if made by the President
himself. The effect, therefore, of the President's order and the
proclamation of the Governor, his appointment of Draft Commissioners, and of the action of such Commissioners, are, I think,
the same as if all these proceedings for the enrollment and draft
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had been especially and directly prescribed by the Act of Congress.
The Draft Commissioner appointed by the Governor must, I
think, be considered as acting for, and exercising the authority of,
the Federal Government, and as a Federal officer for the performance of these duties, as much as if he had been directly appointed
by the President. The men to be raised by the draft were to be
raised for the Federal and not for the State service. The whole
proceeding was an exertion of Federal and not State authority,
for the purpose of selecting the men who were to be called into
service, and, so far as the relator is concerned, for the purpose
of bringing him into the service of the United States. The error
in copying the name did not, I think, affect the validity of the
proceedings, as the identity of the person intended was clearly
ascertained. The proceedings were, I think, valid, and imposed
upon the relator the duty of entering the service, and authorized
the Commissioner to hold him for that purpose. If, therefore, the
State judiciary have jurisdiction to determine the questions arising
under the present writ, the relator should, I think, be remanded
to the custody of the Commissioner.
But should these views be erroneous, still I think, beyond all
controversy, there is enough appearing in the case to show that the
Commissioner in good faith claims to hold the relator under Federal authority ; that this authority is not set up as a mere pretext,
but that the Commissioner and the authorities under whom he acts
are honestly endeavoring to carry into effect the requirements of
an Act of Congress and the Federal Executive in a matter vital
to the safety of the nation. The question, therefore, of the
authority of the Commissioner to hold this prisoner for the purpose stated, is one which I think appropriately belongs to the
Federal and not the State judiciary. Upon this point of the
jurisdiction, as applied to the facts of the present case, I concur
with the Chief Justice and my brother MANXING.
In either view of the case, therefore, the prisoner cannot be
discharged by this Court.
CAMPBELL,

J.-Under the Act of Congress of July 17th, 1862,
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the Governor of Michigan was called upon, through the War Department, to furnish troops for the service of the United States,
to a specified number. The requisition from the Secretary of
War set forth certain measures, which he was recommended to
adopt, in case the State laws had not adequately provided for the
emergency. The principal one of these suggestions, which becomes important in this case, was that commissioners should be
appointed by him, to take charge of the drafting, where that
should be resorted to, and see that it was properly carried out.
The relator was enrolled, and, not having made out any claim to
exemption or disability, his name was attempted to be copied from
the list on a slip of paper, with the other names, and the slip
placed in the box and drawn out. Upon this slip the name was
written "Spangle," instead of cSpangler." No other person of
the same name or any similar name resided in the drafting district,
and his name was properly spelled on the list from which the slip
was copied. He failed to appear when warned, and was arrested;
and now claims to be discharged, on the ground that the proceedings to draft him hake been had by the State authorities, in disregard of State laws, and that they cannot be justified under any
other.
The question of misnomer is not one which can be conclusive in
such a case. If the relator's name had not been properly enrolled,
it would have been open to more doubt perhaps; but how. far the
mistake would have vitiated the draft is not material in this case.
But here the person was not only identified clearly, but all the steps
necessary, previous to the placing the slip in the box, were regular.
This slip was copied from the correct list, and the omission was a
clerical error, which, under the facts, could not possibly have caused
confusion. The slip drawn was the one which had been placed in
the box to represent him, and I think did represent him when
drawn. The law does not require the name itself to be put in the
box. The number corresponding to it is equally available; and all
that can be required, as it seems to me, is that the slip drawn should
appear, beyond doubt, to represent the person properly named in
the roll from which it is copied.
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The question, then, which it becomes necessary to determine, is
whether he is lawfully held by the authorities of the State of
Michigan. And as the course of the argument has necessarily
involved an inquiry into the source and extent of the authority of
the various public officials who have had charge of the raising of
troops, and questions of jurisdiction have become involved among
others, it seems unavoidable that the subject, from its present importance, should receive more extended notice than might suffice in
ordinary cases.
No question arises here concerning any forces except those which
are technically and legally called the Militia, as in no other cases
is the drafting system applied through the State authorities.
Congress has power, under Art. 1, Sect. 8, of the Constitution,
"to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the
Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions ;" and also "to
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for
governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of
the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of officers, and the authority of training the militia according
to the discipline prescribed by Congress."
By Sect. 2 of Art. 2, it is provided that "the President shall be
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the militia of the several States, when called into the service
of the United States."
Even without the aid of the uniform practical construction which
is to be found in the legislation of Congress, from the organization
of the Government, there could be no difficulty in coming to a conclusion on some, at least, of the most important questions attending
the establishment and use of the militia force, which we are now
called upon to consider.
In the first place, it has been understood that Congress may and
should determine the classes of persons from whom the militia
should be filled up, either entirely or so far as it can be done without injuring the necessary organizations of the General and State
Governments. This it has done by declaring, in general terms,
that it shall be composed of all the free able-bodied white male
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citizens of the respective States, resident therein, of the age of
eighteen years and under the age of forty-five years, except such
persons as are, by the Acts of Congress, or by the State laws, expressly exempted: 1 U. S. Stat. 271. Congress having declared
of whom the militia shall consist, may provide, and has in a general
way provided, for organizing, arming, and disciplining them. But
Congress, as we have seen, cannot govern them, except when employed in the service of the United States; and they can only be
called into the service of the United States when they are wanted
for active du'ty, in protecting or vindicating the authority of the
Government against actual or expected resistance. In time of
peace (which may be fairly expected to be our ordinary condition),
Congress has, then, no direct agency in managing the militia; and
although it may prescribe how they are to be oiganized, equipped,
and disciplined, yet the actual government is to be exercised by the
States. All the machinery is, therefore, in ordinary times, in the
hands of the States. That the requirements of Congress are as
binding on them as on individuals, is unquestionably true. The
question is not whether they can omit lawfully the duties enjoined
upon them. The only question which concerns us, in the present
inquiry, is whether, in performing these duties, they act as mere
agents and ministers of Congress, or whether they act as communities, recognised by the Constitution, and owing the performance of
these particular functions to the mandates of the Constitution, as
directed especially to themselves. The language of that instrument,
when it gives Congress power to govern the militia when called into
service, shows that their government at other times is-not by Congress. In other words, while they are sometimes governed by the
State, and sometimes by Congress, they are never governed by
both at the same time; and the governing action, therefore, cannot
be a mere agency on either side. Nor is the President Commanderin-Chief of the militia not called into service.
This doctrine has always been recognised as applicable to the
militia system by the Acts of Congress, which refer the whole work
of organization to the State laws and authorities. And no one, in
time of peace, or in time of war, would hesitate in declaring that,
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when not in Government service, the militia are under State autho
rity. Assuming that the Courts of the Union will not interfere
with parties in State custody or control, nor the State Courts with
those under the control or custody of the United States, we are
to inquire whether, in the present instance, the relator is in custody
of the United States or of the authorities of Michigan. The answer
to this inquiry may properly determine how far we ought to proceed
in the investigation of the facts before us. The question does not
introduce any antagonism of jurisdiction, for all of these matters
are undoubtedly regulated by the Constitution, in order to promote
the efficiency of the militia to secure the safety and protection of
the entire country; and the functions thus separately vested are so
separated, because the separation was regarded as desirable, to
secure economy of general expenditure, and to save the multiplication of offices, and the other familiar difficulties which have been so
happily avoided by our composite system. By leaving each branch
of jurisdiction where -itbelongs, we are only obeying a rule which
is addressed to both alike, by the same authority which is our
supreme guide in legal action.
The Constitution contemplates that every available man in the
country may be required by Congress to be included in the militia
-subject to such exceptions as they may allow, or as the nature
of our institutions may require. We must also assume that it contemplates that, whenever required, some means must exist by which
their services may be obtained. Congress may provide for calling
out the troops, but the orders must necessarily emanate from the
Commander-in-Chief, under whose control the troops in service
must be held. The Act of 1862 (in substantial conformity in this
regard with former laws) authorizes the President of the United
States to call forth the militia, for such period, not exceeding nine
months, as he may appoint, and declares that the militia so called
shall be mustered in and continue to serve for the term specified,
unless discharged by the order of the President. This law, like all
the other statutes, distinguishes between the calling forth and the
mustering in, and makes the mustering in the commencement of
service. This is in strict accordance with the decision in Houston
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vs. Moore, 5 Wh. 1, and Martin vs. HJout, 12 Id. 19, in both of
which cases it was held that the militia did not cease to be State
troops until received into the actual service of the United States.
The case would have raised no difficulty, had it not been for some
further provisions in the Act of Congress, which are supposed to
have introduced a more direct agency of the Union authorities into
tho work of getting the forces in the field. The Act provides that
"if by reason of defects in existing laws, or in the execution of
them, in the several States, or any of them, it shall be found necessary to provide for enrolling the militia and otherwise putting this
Act into execution, the President is authorized in such cases to
make all necessary rules and regulations," &c. And, in pursuance
of this Act, the Secretary of War issued a request to the Governor
of Michigan to furnish the quota of this State, suggesting at the
same time the propriety-in case the existing State laws had not
made adequate provision for the emergency-that Commissioners
shotild be appointed to superintend the drafting operations, and
making some further. recommendations. These recommendations
were accepted by the Governor, and issued in the form of general
orders. It is claimed that this action was an assent on his part to
waive his official authority as Executive of Michigan, and to perform duties as an agent of the War Department; and it is claimed,
on the other hand, that he was acting as Governor, and that his
action was void, because not had under any law which he could, as
Governor, carry out; on the ground that he must carry out the
State laws, if any. And these objections on the. one hand to the
jurisdiction of this Court, and on the other to the legality of the
Governor's action, are somewhat closely connected.
It was claimed, on the argument, that any regulations in aid of
the defects of existing laws, or their execution, must be made by
the President; and that these regulations emanate not from him,
but from the Secretary of War, and are therefore invalid. This
objection is not maintainable. The Secretary of War is in this
respect nothing more than the channel of Executive action ; and it
is well settled that his action is to be regarded as the action of the
President, at least until disapproved. The President is not obliged
VOL. Xi-39
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to leave his more important duties to attend to official details; and
the action of his secretaries must be presumed to have been directed
or approved by him, so as to make it his own - Wilcox vs. Jackson,
13 Pet. 498; United States vs. Bliason, 16 Id. 291; Williams vs.
United States, 1 How. 290; Parkervs. United States, 1 Pet. 293J
Nor can the fact that instead of adopting regulations by Act ofI
was authorized toI
Congress to supply deficiencies, the President
adopt these regulations, change the relation of the State to the'
Union authorities, where the State authorities are called upon to
act. There is nothing in the Constitution which requires Congress
to adopt such specific regulations in regard to the performance of
the duty of calling out the militia. That duty must be performed
by the Executive authorities; and if the laws were entirely silent
on the subject, the President, when authorized to call out the forces,
must of necessity have power enough to provide methods and adopt
regulations for enabling the men to be obtained. As supreme
Executive of the nation, and as Commander-in-Chief of the forces
called out, he has certainly been invested with all needful authority.
It would be absurd to suppose that when he is empowered to determine, without appeal, and absolutely, the existence of a state of
things which justifies military interference, and is also empowered
to call out the forces and suppress resistance to the Government, he
is powerless, after exercising these high prerogatives, to direct how
to carry out his own lawful orders, unless every one else shall have
performed the duties devolving upon them. Public emergencies
like those contemplated in the Constitution do not admit of delay,
and require broad discretionary powers in all matters of detail ;
and Congress, in leaving these matters to his discretion, not only
vested in him no strange or unusual powers, but acted wisely. The
defects in different parts of the country could not be supposed to be
the same. The State laws differ, and in some places more complete preparation had been made than elsewhere. In some places,
where troops might be legally called for, the ordinary local action
was not to be looked for at all, by reason of the pressure of rebellion. Uniformity of action, therefore, could not be expected,
and the matter was properly left to the discretion of the President,
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which, when exercised in such matters, must be respected: United
States vs. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291; Martin vs. Mott, 12 Wh. 19;
Luther vs. Borden, 7 How. 1; People vs. Lewis, 7 J. 78 Lackingtonvs. Smith, Pet. C. C. R. 466; Vanderheyden-vs. Young, 11
J. 150. It is one .of the fundamental rules of construction, that,
when duties are imposed upon an executive officer of the Government, and he is confined to no specific method of carrying them out,
he may select such means as are reasonable and proper, at his
option.
So far as the State of Michigan is concerned, the President has
not found it necessary to do anything more than make the proper
requisition on the Governor, leaving him to carry it into effect by
the State laws, if under them provisions had already been adequately
made to furnish the troops, and if not, by other means-suggesting.
as appropriate in such case the steps actually taken. That these
suggestions or requests are equally valid with a positive order, there
can be no question. The requisition for troops is such an order,
whether made in one shape or another: Martin vs. Mott, 12 Wh.
19. Although as an executive head of a State, there may be no
process of compulsion directly against a Governor (as decided in
Commonwealth of Kentucky vs. Denison, Governor of Ohio, 24
How. 66), yet he would be guilty of a gross violation of duty were
he to disregard such a requirement; and the call must then be carried
out through other channels. But this immunity from ordinary
process has led with manifest propriety to the use, in intercourse
between public officials, of the courtesy common between nations,
of resorting to requests instead of peremptory demahds-a courtesy
which the authorities of this State have fairly deserved. But it is
made a question whether the Governor can lawfully exercise such
a discretion as is here left to him, of determining whether resort is
necessary to any new mode of action.
To determine this we must first look to see precisely the nature
of the discretion so remitted to him. It does not involve merely
the question whether the State laws have made adequate provision
for answering the call of the President. The act of Congress contemplates that there may be adequate laws inadequately carried
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out. The first question is to some extent one of law, and yet. n~t
entirely, because the adequacy of the laws may depend somewhat
upon the nature of the emergency. The second question is one involving considerations of mixed law and fact, peculiarly proper
for executive consideration, and as plainly proper to be determined by
the local Executive who alone can have complete access to the
necessary information. When he, as the organ of the State, is
called upon to furnish troops, he is necessarily required to come to
a conclusion whether those troops are attainable by ordinary means,
and at once. If not, the call of the government must be disregarded,
or resort must be had to other necessary and proper means. But to
disregard the call, would be to violate the Constitution of the
United States, which gives Congress -an absolute right to authorize
the President to make the call In Michigan, the Governor is
made by the Constitution itself, "Commander-in-Chief of the military and naval forces, and may call out such forces to execute the
laws, to suppress insurrections and to repel invasions.' He, therefore, isvested with such discretionary powers as are vested anywhere;
and, as in the case of the President, he must have sufficient power
to carry out any duty imposed upon him by the Constitution or the
laws. In military emergencies he has the combined powers of a
civil executive and a military Commander-in-Chief, subject, of course,
to any constitutional restrictions, but subject to nothing which will
prevent his obeying the Constitution. What might be the consequence of a needless resort to any but the regular and ordinary
machinery of arriving at a lawfully prescribed result, when such
machinery exists, is only to be regarded when such violation of duty
appears. The orders of the President do not contemplate any
needless resort to discretionary means, and it is not to be presumed
that such a resort has been had without necessity. But it is proper
to examine the State law of 1862 with reference to the variations
from it which have occurred.
The law provides how an enrollment shall be made, but expressly
authorizes the Governor to cause the lists to be made by any other
person when deemed necessary for the public safety. L. 1862, p.
22. Of this necessity the Governor is sole judge. In obtaining
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from each county the necessary number, the Governor is directec
to notify the sheriff of the number required, and thereupon the
sheriff is required to notify the county clerk or his deputy ; and,
together, they are to copy from the lists, and put in a box, all the
names on these lists, and draw them as jurors are drawn; and the
persons so drawn and liable to do military duty, shall be determined to be legally held to serve. In drawing jurors, if a person
drawn is known to one of the attendant officers to be dead, or insane,
or to have permanently removed from the county, another may be
drawn in his stead. 2 0. L. 1191, § 4368. If the sheriff and
clerk have a similar power in drafting, they have no further power.
The only preliminary method of establishing exemptions, provided
for by the statute "of 1862, is by application to the assessors, at
the annual review of the assessment rolls. L. 1862, p. 47. The
officers are required to note as exempt, at that time, all who are
actually exempt by law, whether claiming exemption or not. But
the law does not give them final and conclusive powers in the matter ; and if the lists are made out otherwise than by them, it gives
them no power at all. It is manifest that if the draft is made by
the sheriff and clerk under this statute, the number actually drawn
may be materially diminished, not only by exemptions but by personal disabilities, unknown or arising after the annual review. The
law of Congress contemplates that, when the States are called upon
to furnish troops, they shall furnish able-bodied soldiers ; and although possibly some latitude is necessary in doing this, yet some
means of securing in advance, as near as may be, the selection of
men who may be lawfully held to service, must be iegarded as very
desirable, if not absolutely necessary. The appointment of these
Commissioners, in accordance with the President's suggestion, to
conduct the draft, by making it, or causing it to be made, in what
is certainly a substantial compliance with all the safeguards of the
statute, furnished a method of securing, with considerable accuracy,
against drafting exempts, or persons physically unfit for service.
In this matter the Governor has adhered as closely to the law as
was possible ; and has carried out its design by supplying its manifest deficiencies. So far as the arrest is concerned, the law is lit-
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erally complied with, for it contemplates that other proper officers
than the sheriff may have custody of the delinquent; and where the
person is not to be mustered in within the county, the sheriff has
no power, under his mere official authority, to go beyond his own
bailiwick. It is evident that the law can only be carried out by
some discretionary agency, under the control of the Governor.
But, even if the law in this respect were complete in its details, it
permits a discharge by the sheriff-on payment of a penalty,
which is not recognised by the Act of Congress, and which, if allowed, would prevent the Governor from furnishing the State quota,
insomuch as no draft is provided for in lieu of the person commuting. The Governor has not, in my judgment, gone beyond the fair
exercise of a legal discretion; and it is unnecessary, therefore, to
consider how far this Court could, if it were not so, review his conduct.
I am opinion that the relator is lawfully detained by the Draft
Commissioner, under the military authority of the State of Michigan;
and that he should remain at the disposal of that officer, as lawfully drafted for service.
Writ dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
MANNING, J., delivered an able opinion concurring for reasons
similar to those assigned by the Chief Justice. We are compelled
to omit it on account of the length of the case.

Supreme Court of the United States.-December Term, 1862.
TEE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. THE BANK OF COMMERCE, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, VS. THE COMMISSIONERS OF TAXES
AND ASSESSMENTS FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF NEW YORK.
The stock of the United States is not subject to State taxation. The case of
Weston vs. City Council of Charleston, 2 Peters 449, commented upon and followed.

In error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
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The opinion of the Court was delivered by
NELSON, 3.-This is a writ of error to the Court of Appeals of
the State of New York.
The question involved in this case is, whether or not the stock
of the United States, constituting a part or the whole of the capital
stock of a bank organized under the banking laws of New York, is
subject to State taxation. The capital of the bank is taxed, under
existing laws in that State, upon valuation, like the property of
individual citizens, and not as formerly, on the amount of the
nominal capital, without regard to loss or depreciation.
According to that system of taxation it was immaterial as to the
character or description of property which constituted the capital,
as the tax imposed was wholly irrespective of it. The tax was like
one annexed to the franchise as a royalty for the grant. But since
the change of this system, it is agreed, the tax is upon the property
constituting the capital.
This stock, then, is held by the bank the same as such stocks are
held by individuals, dnd alike subject to taxation or exemption by
State authority. On the part of the bank, it is claimed that the
question was decided in the case of Weston and Others vs. The
City Council of Charleston, 2 Peters 449, in favor of exemption.
In that case the stocks were in the hands of individuals, which were
taxed by the city authorities under a law of the State. The Court
held the law imposing the tax unconstitutional. This decision
would seem not only to cover the case before us, but to determine
the very point involved in it.
It has been argued, however, that the form or mode of levying
the tax under the ordinance of the city of Charleston was different
from that of the law of New York, and hence may well distinguish
the case and its principles from the present one. This difference
consists in the circumstance that the tax in the former case was
imposed on the stock eo nomine, whereas, in the present, it is taxed
in the aggregate of the tax-payer's property, and to be valued at
its real worth in the same manner as all other items of his taxable
property. The stock is not taxed by name, and no discrimination
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is made in favor or against it, hut is regarded like any other
security for money or chose in action.
It is true, that the ordinance imposing the tax in the case of
Weston vs. The City of Charleston did discriminate between the
stock of the United States and other property; that is, the ordinance did not purport to impose a tax upon all the property owned
by the tax-payers of the city, and speciall excepted certain property altogether from taxation. The only uniformity in the taxation was, that it was levied equally upon the articles enumerated,
and which were taxed. To this extent it might be regarded as a
tax on the stock eo nomine.
But does this distinction thus put forth between the two cases
distinguish them in principle ? The argument admits that a tax eo
nomine, or one that distinguishes unfavorably the stock of the
United States from the other property of the tax-payer, cannot be
upheld. Why.? Because, as is said, if this power to discriminate
be admitted to belong to the State, it might be exercised to the
destruction of the value of the stock, and consequently of the power
or function of the Federal Government to issue it for any practical
uses.
It will be seen, therefore, that the distinction claimed rests upon
a limitation of the exercise of the taxing power of the State; that
if the tax is imposed indiscriminately upon all the property of the
individual or corporation, the stock may be included in the valuation; if not, it must be excluded or cannot be reached. The argument concedes that the Federal stock is not subject to the general
taxing power of the State, a power resting in the discretion of its
constituted authorities as to the objects of taxation, and the amount
imposed. It is true that in many, if not in all of the constitutions
of the States, provisions will be found confining the power of the
Legislature to the passage of uniform laws in the taxation of the
real and personal property within her jurisdiction. But tlis is a
restraint upon the power imposed by the State itself. In the
absence of any such restriction, discrimination in the tax would rest
in the discretion of the Legislature. Whether regulated by the
Constitution or by the act of the Legislature, is a question of State
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policy, to be determined by the people in convention or by the
Legislature. In either case the power to discriminate or not is in
the State. How, then, can this limitation upon the taxing power
of a State, which the argument assumes may be used to discriminate
against the Federal stocks, be enforced ? The power to enforce it
must be independent of the State to be effectual. There can be
but one answer to this question, and that is, by the supreme judicial
tribunal of the Union. But is this Court a fit tribunal to sit in
judgment upon the question, whether the Legislature of a State
has exercised its taxing power wisely or unwisely over objects of
taxation confessedly, as the argument assumes, within its discretion ?
And is the question a judicial question? We think not. There
is, and must always be, a considerable latitude of discretion in
every wise government in the exercise of the taxing power, both as
to the objects and the amount, and of discrimination in respect to
both. Property invested in religious institutions, seminaries of
learning, charitable institutions, and the like, are examples. Can
any Court say that th6se are discriminations which, upon the argument that seeks to distinguish the present from the case of Weston
vs. The City of Oharleston, would or would not take it out of that
case ? A Court may appropriately determine whether property
taxed was or was not within the taxing power, but, if within, not
that the power has or has not been discreetly exercised. We cannot, therefore, yield our assent to the soundness of the distinction
taken by the counsel between this case and the one referred to.
Upon looking at the case of Weston vs. The City of Oharleston,
it will be seen that the decision of a majority of the Court was not
at all placed. upon the distinction we have been considering, but
upon ground much broader and wholly independent of it.
The tax upon the stocks was regarded as a tax upon the exercise
of the power of Congress "to borrow money on the credit of the
United States." The exercise of this power was interfered with to
the extent of the tax imposed by the city authorities; that the liability of the certificates of stock to taxation by a State in the hands
of individuals affected their value in the market, and the free and
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unrestrained exercise of the power. The Chief Justice observes,
that "if the right to impose a tax exists, it is a right which, in its
nature, acknowledges no limits. It may be carried to any extent
within the jurisdiction of the State or corporation which imposes it,
which the will of each State or corporation may prescribe."
He then refers to the taxing power of the State, its importance
and extensive operation, and the delicacy and difficulty of fixing
any limit to its exercise; and that in the performance of this duty,
which had, in other cases, devolved on the Court, it was considered
as a necessary consequence of the supremacy of the Federal Government that its action in the exercise of its legitimate powers should
be free and unembarrassed by any conflicting powers of the States,
and that the powers of a State cannot rightfully be so exercised as
to impede and obstruct the free course of those measures which this
Government may rightfully adopt.
He further observed, that "the sovereignty of a State extends to
everything which exists by its own authority or is introduced by
its permission, but not to those means which are employed by Con.
gress to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the
people of the United States. The attempt to use the power of
taxation on the means employed by the Government of the Union
inpursuance of the Constitution, is itself an abuse, because it is
the usurpation of a power which the people of a single State cannot
give ;" and the Chief Justice then adds, "a contract made by the
Government in the exercise of its powers to borrow money on the
credit of the United States, is undoubtedly independent of the will
of any state in which the individual who lends may reside, and is
undoubtedly an operation essential to the important objects for
which the Government was created."
It is apparent, in studying this opinion in connection with the
opinions of the Court in the cases of fcCulloh vs. The State of
Maryland, 4 Wheaton 116, and of O8born vs. The United "State8,
9 Id. 732, that it is but a corollary from the doctrines so ably expounded by the Chief Justice in the two previous cases in the interpretation of an analogous power in the Constitution.
The doctrine maintained in those cases is, that the powers granted

THE PEOPLE vs. COMMISSIONERS OF TAXES.

by the people of the States to the General Government, and embodied in the Constitution, are supreme within their scope and
operation, and that this Government may exercise these powers in
its appropriate departments, free and unobstructed by any State
legislation or authority. That within this limit this Government is
sovereign and independent, and any interference by the State
governments tending to the interruption of the full legitimate exercise of the powers thus granted, is in conflict with that clause of
the Constitution which makes the Constitution and the laws of the
United States in pursuance thereof "the supreme law of the land."
The result of this doctrine is, that the exercise of any authority
by a State government trenching upon any of the powers granted
to the General Government is, to the extent of the interference, an
attempt to resume the grant in defiance of constitutional obligation ;
and more than this, if the encroachment or usurpation to any extent
is admitted, the principle involved would carry the exercise of the
authority of the State to an indefinite limit, even to the destruction
of the power. For, as truly said by the Chief Justice in the case
of Weston vs. The City of Charleston, in respect to the taxing
power of the State, "if the right to impose the tax exists, it is a
right which, in its nature, acknowledges no limit; it may be carried
to any extent within the jurisdiction of the State or corporation
which imposes it, which the will of each State and corporation may
prescribe."
An illustration of this principle in respect to the powers of the
judicial department of this Government, is found in the case of
The United States vs. Peters, 5 Cranch 115. There the Legislature of the State of Pennsylvania attempted to annul the judgment
of a Court of the United States, and destroy all rights acquired
under it. It was quite apparent, if the exercise of that power could
be admitted, the principle involved might annihilate the whole
power of the Federal judiciary within that State. The act of the
Legislature did not profess to exercise this power generally, but
only in the particular case, on the ground the Court had no jurisdiction. But the Chief Justice, in giving the opinion of the Court,
very naturally observes, that the right to determine the jurisdiction
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of the Courts was not placed by the Constitution in the State
legislatures, but in the supreme judicial tribunal of the nation. If
time allowed, many other cases might be referred to illustrating the
principle in respect to other departments of this Government.
The conclusive answer to the attempted exercise of State authority in all these cases is, that the exercise is in derogation of the
powers granted to the General Government, within which, it is
admitted, it is supreme. That government whose powers, executive,,
legislative, or judicial, whether it is a government of enumerated
powers like this one or not, are subject to the control of another
distinct government, cannot be sovereign or supreme, but subordinate and inferior to the other. This is so palpable a truth that
argument would be superfluous. Its functions and means essential
to the administration of the government, and the employment of
them, are liable to constant interruption and possible annihilation.
The case in hand is an illustration.' The power to borrow money
on the credit of the United States is admitted. It is one of the
most 'important and even vital functions of the General Government, and its exercise a means of supplying the necessary resources
to meet exigencies in times of peace or war. But of what avail is
the function or the means if another government may tax it at discretion? It is apparent that the power, function, or means, however important and vital, are at the mercy of that government.
And it must be always remembered, if the right to impose a tax at
all exists on the part of the other government, "it is a right which,
in its nature, acknowledges no limits." And the principle is equally
true in respect to every other power or function of a government
subject to the control of another.
In our complex system of government it is oftentimes difficult to
fix the true boundary between the two systems, State and Federal.
The Chief Justice, in Mc~ulloh vs. The State of Mfaryland, endeavored to fix this boundary upon the subject of taxation. He
observed, "If we measure th6 power of taxation residing in a State
by the extent of sovereignty .which the people of a single State
possess, and cun confer on its government, we have an intelligible
standard applicable to every case to which the power may be applied.
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We have a principle which leaves the power of taxing the people
and property of a State unimpaired, which leaves to a State the
command of all its resources, and which places beyond its reach all
those powers which are conferred by the people of the United States
on the Government of the Union, and all those meas which are
given for the purpose of carrying those powers into execution. We
have a principle which is safe for the States and safe for the
Union."
All will agree that this is the enunciation of a true principle, and
it is only by a wise and forbearing application of it that the operation of the powers and functions of the two governments can be
harmonized. Their powers are so intimately blended and connected
that it is impossible to define or fix the limit of the one without, at
the same time, that of the other, in respect to any one of the great
departments of government. When the limit is ascertained and
fixed, all perplexity and confusion disappear. Each is sovereign
and independent in its sphere of action, and exempt from the interference or control of the other, either in the means employed or
functions exercised; and, influenced by a public and patriotic spirit
on both sides, a conflict of authority need not occur or be feared.
Judgment of the Court below is reversed.

Supreme Court of Maine.
OPINION OF THE JUDGES ON THE POWER OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS TO LEVY A TAX TO COMMUTE THE DRAFT.
Under the Act of Congress of March 3d, 1863, ch. 73, for enrolling anu calling

out the National forces, the duty of service by the person drafted, or of the
procuration of a substitute or payment of commutation in lieu thereof, is strictly
a private, personal liability; and a municipal corporation has no power under
the Constitution and laws of Maine to levy a tax on the public to discharge

such liability.
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STATE OF MAINE,

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

Augusta, June 27, 1863.
To the Hon. Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
Judicial Court:
Various towns in this State are voting in public meeting $300
as a commutation in money for each of their citizens that may be
drafted into the military service of the United States, under the
law passed by the last Congress, and approved March 3d, 1863,
entitled "cAn Act for enrolling and calling out the national forces,
and for other purposes."
It is feared by.many good citizens that serious complications
and embarrassments may result to. the towns which pledge their
credit to raise money to supply these commutations, as well as to
individuals who advance the money therefor.
The Constitution of this State authorizes the Governor to require the ",Opinions" of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial
Court ",upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions."
Under this power I deem it my duty to ask the opinion of the
Court upon the legal questions involved in the following interrogatories, viz.:1. Has a city or town any legal right to pledge its credit to
raise money for the purpose of paying the commutations of such
of its citizens as may be drafted into the military service of the
United States, under the law aforesaid?
2. Has a city or town any legal right to raise money by taxation to provide commutations for such of its citizens as may be
thus drafted?
I have the honor to remain yours, very respectfully,
ABNER COBURN,

Governor of Maine.
Augusta, July 2, 1863.
Sir: The undersigned have the honor to submit the following
snswers to the interrogatories proposed in your communication of
the 27th of June last.
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By the express terms of the Constitution Congress has power
to declare war; to raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a navy; to make rules for the government and regulation of
the land and naval forces; to provide for calling forth the militia
to execute the laws of the Union, and suppress insurrection and
repel invasion; to provide for organizing and disciplining the
militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed
in the service of the United States; and to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, &c. The power of Congress in the premises is
supreme. In a great national emergency, when the national unity
and republican institutions are in peril, whether from foreign foes
or, worse still, from domestic enemies, treasonably endeavoring to
overthrow the Union and subvert our institutions, it has the right
to command all the resources of the nation, the lives of its citizens,
to prevent by any and all proper means that fearful anarchy which
would be so imminent if its dissolution should become an accomplished fact.
In pursuance of the' powers thus briefly indicated, and to meet
the present crisis, the Act of Congress approved March 3d. 1863,
chap. 73, entitled an act for enrolling and calling out the national
forces, and for other purposes, was passed.
By sect. 13 it was enacted that any person drafted 'and notified
to appear as aforesaid, may, on or before the day fixed for his
appearance, furnish an acceptable substitute to take his place in
the draft; or he may pay to such person as the Secretary of War
may authorize to receive it, such sum not exceeding $300, as the
Secretary may determine for the procuration of such substitute,
which sum shall be fixed at a uniform rate by a general' order
made at the time of ordering a draft for any State or Territory;
and thereupon such person so furnishing the substitute or paying
the money shall be discharged from further liability under that
draft, &c.
As Congress has the power to require and command the services of each citizen, so it may prescribe the mode and manner for
obtaining such services. The obligation of obedience rests upon
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the citizen. It is part of the duty he owes the Gsvernment which
protects his rights. The duty is personal-that of each citizen.
If drafted, the service must be his personal service. If a substitute is procured, ,the procuration of such substitute" is to be
made by the person drafted. If commutation-money be paid, he
is to make such payment. True, a friend may volunteer as a
substitute, or may aid in procuring the money to pay whatever
sum may be determined upon by the Secretary of War as the
price of exemption, as he may aid him in discharging any other
personal liability. But the liability to serve, to procure a substitute -who shall be accepted, or to pay the suni fixed as a commutation, are all none the less personal duties and liabilities. They
are as much personal liabilities as the obligation to pay a tax duly
assessed, to discharge a debt due, or to perform an act, the performance of which is imposed by contract or by statute. It will
be perceived, then, that the question amounts to this, whether a
town can legally raise money gratuitously to discharge the
pecuniary obligations of its citizens, or to procure their exemption
from military or other service. Is such a power conferred upon
the municipal corporations of this State?
The general power of towns to raise money is given by the Revised Statutes, 1858, chap. 3, sect. 26, in these words: "The
qualified voters of a town may raise such sums as are necessary for
the maintenance and support of schools and the poor; for making
and repairing highways and town-ways and bridges; for the purchasing and repairing and fencing burying-grounds; for purchasing
or building and keeping in repair a hearse and house therefor for
the exclusive use of its citizens, and for other necessary town
charges." By subsequent acts, further powers have been conferred
upon towns, and the exercise of doubtful powers has been- conferred by legislative authority. But the raising of money under
statutory provisions to co-operate with the General Government, is
manifestly to be distinguished from raising money for purposes
unauthorized by any existing law.
The words "other necessary town charges" do not constitute 0,
new and distinct grant of indefinite and unlimited power to raise
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money for any purpose whatever at the will and pleasure of a
majority. They embrace all incidental expenses arising directly
or indirectly in the due and legitimate exercise of the various
powers conferred by statute.
While towns may raise money to discharge all liabilities in the
performance of these multiplied municipal duties, they cannot
(unless new powers are conferred, or an excess of power receives
a subsequent legal ratification) transcend their authority and incur
liabilities in no way arising in the course of its exercise. Thus it
has been held by this Court that, the raising a tax for the discharge of a contract entered into by a town with the corporation
of a toll bridge for the free passage of its citizens over it, was
illegal. It has likewise been held under similar statutes in other
States, that a town had no right to raise money for the celebration
of any great national event, as the capture of Cornwallis or the
Declaration of Independence. So it was decided in Emery vs.
.Hooper, 14 Maine 395, in the very clear and conclusive opinion
of Mr. Justice SHEPLEY, that a town had no authority to raise
money for the purpose of re-distributing it among its citizens.
Much more, then, have they no right to raise money to give as a
mere gratuity to one or more citizens to enable them to escape the
performance of services, which every citizen should cheerfully
render as due to Government, upon the prosperity and perpetuity
of which the future hopes of humanity must rest.
Were a town to raise money to be distributed by'way of gift to
favored individuals, the tax assessed for such a purpose could not
for a moment be upheld. Still less can it be, when the obvious
and inevitable tendency of it would be to defeat the objects for
which the Act of Congress before referred to was passed. That
was a bill to raise soldiers, not to raise money. Its primary and
especial purpose was to suppress insurrection by means of an armed
force, to be raised in pursuance of its provisions. If one town may
assess taxes to pay the commutation-money of those who may be
drafted, so may all, and the Government may be left without a
soldier for its protection, and the nation surrendered into the power
of those who are warring for its destruction; the wealth and tax
VOL. XI.-
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able property of the community would be diverted from the defence
of Government, and the resources of the State would be turned to
its destruction by thus depriving it of the means necessary for its
preservation. *We therefore answer each of the interrogatories in
the negative.
JOHN APPLETON.

-R. D. RiCE.
JONAS CUTTING.

W. DAvIs.
EDWARD KENT.
C. W.

WALTON.

J. G. DICKERSON.
WM. G. BARROWS.
To ABNER COBURN, Governor of Maine, Augusta.
We have been furnished the foregoing
by the courtesy of one of the Judges,
and we gladly publish it, for the early
protest which it contains, against what
we regard as a most factious and pernicious proceeding, on the part of some
few towns and cities-that of attempting
to raise money, by way of taxation upon
the general property of the municipality,
to relieve a certain class of its inhabitants from the performance of a duty
of service owing to the National Government. It must be obvious to every lawyer, who is not absolutely infatuated by
his devotion to partisah and political
prepossessions of opinion, that such a
course is entirely without the shadow
of the slightest justification, either in
reason or law.
For, if we assume that the mode in
which the United States Governmenthave
attempted to bring the militia of the several States into actual service, in defence
of the integrity of our Nationality, is
not justified by any fair or allowable
construction of the powers delegated to
the National Government by the United
States Constitution, which is the only

mode in which they could obtain any
such authority; if we admit all this to
be probable (and we have not sufficiently
examined the subject to be satisfied that
such a concession is justifiable upon any
ground except that of argument), we do
not make the slightest advance towards
obtaining a basis for taxation, in order
to relieve those who are thus unlawfully
subjected to unjust burdens. The State
governments owe no duty of relieving
the common citizen of both State and
National sovereignties, from the urgent
requirements of the latter Government.
The State sovereignty has no more authority to interpose its aid in such a
case, than the State Courts have to
reverse the decisions of the National
Courts upon the ground that in their
judgments such decisions are erroneous.
Much less do the towns or other subordinate municipalities of the State owe
any such duty to its inhabitants. Each
successive ring-of these concentric circles of empire, imperium in impe-io, must

be content with the performance bf its
own legitimate functions. Nothing could
have a more vicious tendemcy, than to
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allow the subordinate sovereignties to
rejudge the decisiofs of its paramount
sovereignty.
Towns and cities then might just as
well raise money, by way of taxation, to
defend suits brought against its inhabitants, for matters in no way connected
with municipal agency or authority, as
to relieve them from any other burden,
lawfully or unlawfully imposed upon
them, by private or public authority.
The truth is, that any such attempt is
simply a conspiracy against the National
authority, and should certainly not originate in State or municipal authority.
Those who admit the right of revolution,
confine it to extreme cases of arbitrary
and tyrannical oppression, and never
justify resistance to regular constituted
authority from the subordinate organizations of the same n ationality. Even
the extreme right of revolution, if it
properly exist anywhere, is a private
and personal right, existing outside of
all legitimate organizations.
Towns and cities could not vote money
by way of taxation, to procure arms and
munitions of war; or establish training
schools, with a view to prepare forces
to defend the towns against the encroachments of the State or National
authority. This would be to compel
the minority to act with the majority, in
setting up and maintaining resistance to
the abuse of legitimate authority, or
what the majority might see fit to characterize as such.
There has been in different directions
a strong disposition manifested towards
the usurpation of unlawful authority;
and we are glad to be able to record our
testimony in favor of the fact, that the
judiciary have, with remarkable uniformity, thus far sustained the old-fashioned views and principles which had
prevailedl in the country before the present crisis in public affairs. And we

trust that this auspicious omen will'continue. The opinion of the Judges in
the foregoing case has possibly a little
more rhetoric than is called for by the
occasion in regard to the duty of the
citizen, and the general character of our
present difficulties. No one will question the general soundness of the views
presented, and a, tribunal of the tried
loyalty and law-abiding character of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine,
scarcely needs any indorsement upon
these points, by way either of protest
on its own behalf, or of formal testimony
of others in regard to its patriotic obligations in the painful and trying national crisis. We regret, therefore, that
it should have -been deemed proper or
necessary to say anything out of the
direct line of argument which the points
involved seemed to require.
All such digressions in such a crisis
as the present, as indeed in all times,
must of necessity tend to weaken-the
force of the decision in the popular
apprehension, by placing it upon that
lower level of mere appeal or argument,
upon which the determinations of judicial tribunals of the last resort should
never consent to stand. Such decisions
rest on authority and not upon appeal
or argument.
But at a period when demonstrations
of loyalty are almost universal, such an
episode, even in a .judicial opinion, is
perhaps excusable, since it results fron
an amiable weakness in human nature,
an unwillingness to be thought singular,
or willingly to give offence.
But however that may be, it is certain
the municipalities of the State have no
power to impose taxes, either to raise or
to prevent raising troops for the service
of the National Government. We know
that these questions, in time of commotion, are always liable to be overridden
and broken down by popular enthusiasm.

